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ABSTRACT
AMBER BREANN MALONE: Exogenous Barriers to the Incorporation of the Second
Generation North Africans in France
(Under the direction of Alice Cooper)

Immigration is a polemic subject in French society today. The 2005 riots in the banlieue and
the government’s response to the outraged and discontented immigrant populations brought forth
a topic left out of public discourse for years before the heavily televised protests. At the forefront
of this public debate surrounding identity and incorporation was one of France’s largest
immigrant populations, North Africans. Marginalization of a particular group often appears in
the terms of social and cultural conflict. While this is true, incorporation of the culture of
migrants and their representation in French society are not the only exogenous factors that must
be considered when analyzing the underrepresentation of North African immigrant descendants in
education achievement and labor market participation in relation to the relative success of
Southern European immigrants. Political-economic factors are largely influential in determining
the opportunities available to immigrant groups. Through databases such as the Institut National
des Statistiques et des Etudes Economique and the Direction de l’Animation des Recherches and
Etudes Statisques, it was possible to measure and compare socio-economic mobility of North
Africans and Southern Europeans in France. This research then applied this information to the
theory of scholars Koopmans, Guiradon, and Gondola. Through an analysis of the secularism,
public discourse and the welfare state (childcare accessibility, tax/benefit systems, education
policies, residential market, and housing policies) this paper this paper determined the extent to
which the political economy and culture as exogenous factors influence the incorporation of
second generation North African descendants. Findings proved that Koopmans, Guiradon, and
Gondola’s theories do apply to the French case and that North Africans experience more
obstacles to incorporation than Southern Europeans.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Introduction
In October of 2005 civil unrest erupted in the banlieues across France. Three
young boys became representative of the tensions between French authority and the
minority youth. Finishing up a game of soccer in a Parisian suburb, Clichy-sous-Bois, the
boys began to make their way home. Upon encountering policemen at the entrance of
their domain, the boys fled and hid in an electrical substation to avoid confrontation with
the police. While Muhittin, Bouna, and Zyed searched for a way out, the boys were
electrocuted in the 10,000-volt substation (Tshimanga 2009, 10).
The deaths of Zyed, Muhittin, and Bouna not only resulted in weeks of rioting in
274 towns throughout France but also forced an uncomfortable, heated discourse on
French identity and the marginalization of immigrants and their descendants in French
society. The immigrant’s perception of being forced out onto the periphery was not
without basis. The statistical data of the educational proficiency and unemployment rates
among 2007 immigrants points toward a divide between the “French” and the “nonFrench.” The events that proceeded discontent with the status quo and the riots were a
government response that seemed to only add more fuel to the fire. The political
community during the time of the French presidential campaign of 2006-2007 brought
immigration into the limelight (Thomas 2013, 66). It was particularly Sarkozy’s “zero
tolerance” stance as Minister of the Interior during the youth rioting and the policies of
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his presidency that resulted in restrictions on immigration. Sarkozy's administration was a
recipient of criticism in the face of such strong social division. This divide became more
apparent in 2007 with French media’s coverage of the riots. In the midst of the banlieue
riots, many media outlets presented participators mostly as Francais issus de
l’immigration (nationalized immigrants), although it was often the case that the younger
generation among them were born in France. Consequently, media outlets contributed to
the hardening of public opinion on the migration question. Depicted as the French
sickness, immigrants and their children, who had been living in France for decades,
began to face societal discrimination from French of all political sides (Martingy 2009,
28). Attention was also given to the debate on national identity due to Sarkozy’s attempt
to garner the support of the right during the presidential election and his aggressive
policies after his inauguration (Martingy 2009, 21).1 The national debate revolved around
three issues: the dissolution of the French identity due to the country’s unfavorable
economic situation in the midst a globalizing world, the challenge of multiculturalism as
a response to the waves of immigrants, and the post-colonial question on how to
reconcile national pride and national repentance (Martingy 2009, 26).
Upon looking at the media representation of rioters, it is evident that this feeling
of marginalization did not rest in all immigrants. Second and third generation nonWestern European immigrants became the image of this discontent. How can
marginalization appear to be an experience typical of non-Western European immigrants?
Are there specific corners of society in which this racial marginalization manifests itself?
Immigration is not a recent phenomenon for France. The post-World War II and

1

The creation of the Ministre de l’Identité Nationale et de l’Immigration was in May 2007.
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decolonization era was a catalyst for waves of migrants surging into Europe from former
European colonies and from other European countries that underwent democratization at
later periods. France experienced immigration of both kinds.

History of Immigration
Today’s statistics of the levels and origins of France’s immigrant population are
generally similar in pattern the immigrant population census of the late post-World War
II years, from the 1960’s to 1970’s. North Africans and Southern Europeans have
continued to compose the majority of France’s immigrant population. Italy, Spain, and
Portugal, specifically, led a steady flow into the pays d’accueil on Europe’s end for some
time. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria compose the majority of the African migration to
France. According to a 2013 study by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques the weight of these two regions continues to be overwhelming in
comparison with other countries of emigration (see Figure 1.1).2 The years of 1960 in
France witnessed a larger immigration of Southern Europeans relative to North Africans
inhabitants until 1968 after which the Southern European population slowly tapered off.
Around approximately the same time, there was growth of the representation of North
African inhabitants in France (see Figure 1.2).

2

Although Southern Europeans and North Africans are generally head-to-head in regard to the
percentages of the arriving populations in France, the statistics concerning the proportion of immigrant
inhabitants demonstrate that the immigrant distribution between these two regions has experienced a
reverse throughout the years.
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POPULATION IN MILLIONS

Post World War Two Southern European
and North African Immigration
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Figure 1.1 This table shows the rate of immigration in millions from 1962 until
2010.
Source: INSEE 2010
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Figure 1.2 This table depicts the reparation of immigrants according to their
country of origin.
Source: INSEE 2010
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Studies show that France has been the beacon for many Southern Europeans and
North Africans since the post-War World II years, and it is the historical context,
including political and economic agents, that catalyzed this pattern of immigration.
Following the end of the Second World War, many European countries witnessed the
disintegration of their colonial outposts. Although Africa was for the most part still under
European direct influence or indirect influence (through indigenous locales), a growing
nationalist sentiment proliferated activist groups (Judt 2005, 279) The surge of
nationalism in these colonies led to the eventual collapse of these empires, and the effects
reverberated throughout Europe by destabilizing an empire that was economically
dependent on the exports of colonialism. For France, its prized colonies were located
along the Mediterranean (for the most part, on the coast of Tunisia, Algeria, and
Morocco) (Judt 2005, 282).
After the end of World War II, France and other European nations were
concerned with social reform and political stability, and such change was not possible
without economic reconstruction (Judt 2005, 82). One of the crucial solutions to this
infrastructural reform was “temporary” work emigration to France which led to an
opening of a multitude of jobs in the tertiary sector. At the end of the war, many countries
experienced a deficiency in skilled labor in the coal, textile, and steel industries (Judt
2005, 332). Consequently, the demand led to labor substitution in two forms: political
refugees and economic immigrants. Between 1945 and 1970, Italy was depleted of seven
million of its inhabitants and Portugal, one and a half million (Judt 2005, 334). Spain
lagged behind Italy and Portugal in regard to its contribution to France’s immigrant
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population. While males took up the labor production in the tertiary sector, Southern
European women (most of whom were of Portuguese origin) found jobs in concierge,
childcare, maintenance, and domestic services. Economic ambition was not the only push
behind Southern European immigration. Political ideologies conflicting with democratic
principles were also an incentive behind Southern European immigration.3 Only after
1974 did the French economy stabilize and labor production increase. Immigrant workers
were no longer a necessity, the result of a diminishing presence of Southern Europeans
(see figure1.2).
Concerning immigration on the end of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, the labor
agreement in France with its colonies and the labor shortage after WW II in Europe
spurred a wave of North African “single” men to relocate to Europe as “temporary
workers” (Bouyarden 2013, 104). Large-scale North African migration to France was
facilitated through two types of channels: “preferential migration arrangements” and
irregular resettlement. Algerian migration was coordinated through bilateral agreements
that gave Algerians privileged status. On the other hand, Tunisian and Moroccan
migration to France was regulated by the Office National d’Immigration (ONI)
(Bouyarden 2013, 109). Similar to Southern European migration patterns, Maghreb
migration was, for the most part, generated by males. Females and families were not a
strong part of the migration demographics until less restrictive immigration policies in the
1960’s and 1970’s (Bouyarden 2013, 104). The striking difference between the
3

France was one of many Western European countries to join the EEC. The European Community was
composed, at the beginning, of the nation-states reflecting a Christian Democrat platform which favored
the notion of a trans-national executive power to protect the sovereignty of the people (Judt 2005, 157).
Given the ideological platform backing the European Community, Spain, Italy, and Portugal did not join
the EC until years later. In the case of Italy, there was a transition to democracy (though an imperfect) one
given the prevailing Fascists administrative structures in the Mezzogiorno (Judt 2005, 257). Before these
shifts to democratic structures, many Southern European nationals sought out opportunities in France.
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advantages of migration for the Southern Europeans and North Africans was the quality
of the positions waiting for and held by these immigrants. While Southern Europeans
seemed to fair well with jobs in the tertiary and domestic sector, North Africans were
often consigned to employment with “highly exploitive conditions” (Bouyarden 2013,
109). The quality of the employment was often indicative of the residential location of
these immigrant workers.

Whereas Southern European females found work in the

domestic sector with jobs that permit them to live around the more affluent French
population, Maghrebian women tended to be segregated off from the prosperous
population around poor quality housing in bidonvilles (1960).
Disparities similar to quality of employment between these two immigrant groups
continue to prevail into the 21st century despite the creation of administrations and
policies targeting equal integration. The status of the children of these immigrants seems
to reflect a pattern present during the first few years of the post-World War II
immigration: the lack of success of North Africans in comparison to Southern Europeans.
Roughly 80 percent Southern European immigrant descendants finishing their education
in 2004 experience an employment rate not too far off from that of native French while a
reported 60 percent of North African descendants found employment within 3 to 5 years
after their education (Jugnot 2012, 63). The accessibility of any type of employment is
heavily dependent on the “qualification” or the possession of a degree. The level of
academic success influences which jobs are available. Although it is expected that
immigrant descendants generally will have higher “non-degreed” rates than the “nonimmigrant/non-immigrant descendant” French (taking into account the language barrier),
explaining the discordance between the Southern European and North African immigrant
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descendant is more difficult. Apropos of the rate of non-degreed immigrant descendants,
41 percent of North African immigrant descendant males (aged 20-35) are without a
diploma above the brevet, below secondary education, while 33 percent of Southern
European males do not hold at least a secondary education diploma (Brinbaum 2012, 47).
The pattern is similar for women as well; more Southern European than North African
women has a secondary degree. Beyond access to employment and possession of a CAP
degree, it is evident that this disparity persists in relation to which group has greater
access to jobs of a higher status. Although immigrant descendants have benefitted from
socio-professional mobility between generations, North African immigrant descendant
have not seen as much socio-professional mobility. Research on immigrant descendants
from age 35 to 50 exhibits that certain employment (employé/ouvrier, profession
intermédiare, cadre) is restricted based on the social status of the father and nationality.

How is the lack of socio-economic mobility of North African immigrants
compared to the Southern European second generation explained? Exploring how
particular factors influenced the manner in which the North African French population
became and continues to be so marginalized and less incorporated than its Southern
European counterpart is the issue this thesis will attempt to unravel. This research will
elucidate the role of “othering” and the French political economy with the range of socioeconomic opportunities of North Africans and Southern Europeans. Through of an
analysis of scholarship and statistic reports, I examined how the influence of these factors
is linked to socio-economic mobility and how their effects materialize in French society.
This linkage will be substantiated through a comparison study among second generation
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immigrants with Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Algerian lineage.
In these six demographic groups, I examined and compared at the general rate of success
for each regional group. This term “success” relates to the socio-economic status of North
Africans and Southern Europeans French. This is based on their access to employment or
integration into the job market after education, level of academic certification, and
household income.
In order to examine the extent of the influence of these determinants on the socioeconomic mobility of North African immigrants, this study will focus only on the second
and third generation immigrants, the children of the immigrants who came between the
later years of the 1960’s and 1975. According to a 2012 population study, a majority of
those immigrant children are between the ages of 25 and 50 (Insee 2012, 109). Immigrant
descendants approximately from the age of 30 to 50 will be studied. This population
focus allows limits as much as possible factors such as the difference between the size of
the Southern European and North African immigrant population from being a variable in
the opportunities allotted to each group. However, there is still decent gap in the
population size which will be taken into account in later chapters. The 2012 dossier
presents statistics reflecting that the smallest gap is among those aged 30 to 50. Given
that these immigrants were born and educated in France, the disparity between North
African descendants and Southern European descendants cannot be attributed significant
influence on the circumstances. This research will focus on unearthing the possible
determinants: “othering” or the French political economy.
Scholars have previously to explain is the difference of the socio-economic
mobility of these two groups: Southern European and North African. Scholars like Didier
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Gondola, Jean-Loup Amselle, and Dominic Thomas attribute this socio-economic
disparity to a visible factor: race. For one author in particular this explanation of the
marginalization of African immigrant groups is rooted in France’s role in colonial
history. Frederick Cooper links the term “republican” to French culture by saying that
this term has become definitive of French identity and those who are not French. The
riots of 2005 are representative of how this “republican model” impedes the integration
of certain immigrants and, more specifically, Muslim immigrants. Cooper argues that
race becomes a defining factor in inclusion due to the fact that this French republican
model has its roots in colonialism (Gondola 2009, 91). The result is a system that actively
works against an “equalizing initiative.” Although Cooper asserts that France’s history of
colonialism has contributed to France’s current issues of ethnic marginalization, he
emphasizes that colonialism should not be depicted as the sole source of France’s social
mobility issue.
Gondola builds on Frederick Cooper’s argument by claiming that ethnic
marginalization is not only an issue of historical racism (colonialism) but also of mediagenerated perceptions and “semantic representation” of Blacks and Beurs, which is a
legacy of colonialism (Gondola 2009, 147). Gondola further elaborates her explanation
through an analysis of popular narratives on Africa and the discourse surrounding
“blackness.” She claims that there is a paradox in this language or narration of
colonialism: Africa is fantasized, but the tales and “iconization” reflect France’s
difficulty to accept its African immigrants in the same manner as it has done with its
European immigrants. “Hoisted as the cornerstone of “New France” and given prominent
place within Greater France, Africa became so heralded in the French imagination
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(Gondola 2009, 151).” The result of this discourse is a depiction, criminalization, and
stigmatization of “African” as inferior to the superior French master. This all arises under
the lack of “policing” of derogatory terms referencing “black” (Gondola 2009, 153).
Gondola bridges this concept of criminalization over into foreign policy to exhibit
how the foreign policy between France and African countries has a double effect.
France’s intervention or interest in African nations can be defined as “predatory” and
degrading (Gondola 2009, 156). The effect is this inability of African immigrants to
accept the treatment of their origin country and, thus, their inability to feel at home in
French society. The author further expounds on this “othering” of African immigrants
through the racialization of “immigrant.” She claims that although France has avoided
ethnic identification, terms such as immigré and immigré née en France are simply a
code word for race in the political realm which does not affect European or American
immigrants in the same way as it does African immigrants (Gondola 2009, 158).
Politicization of this type of termination does not contribute to social fluidity but confines
all groups, immigrant and non-immigrant, to a racial hierarchy.
To detail how semantics, discourse, and media contribute to the success gap
between European and African immigrants, Gondola declares that integration is more that
social equality. According to her article, integration denotes a “moral membership
(Gondola 2009, 159).” She argues that this moral membership fits W.E.B DuBois’s
definition, “the public and psychological wages of whiteness.” She argues that whiteness
is euphemism of Frenchness, and this has allowed the successful integration of European
immigrants. The omission by scholars of “whiteness” having a role in this issue is proof
of the invisibility of whiteness and visibility of black and beur. The author concludes that
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the visibility of the immigration and their exclusion is due in part to their racialization in
public discourse, media, culture, etc. European immigrants achieve economic privileges
through their invisibility or whiteness (Gondola 2009, 160).
Dominic Thomas does not veer far off from Gondola and Cooper’s assertion that
race is a factor in the differentiating reception of African immigrants and European
immigrants. Through an exploration of the literature of African French writers, Thomas
examines how the relationship between France and African countries is conceptualized
and interpreted through the eyes of immigrant descendants. Through Franco-African
literature, the author argues that discrimination various among minorities meaning that
some minorities realize that their skin is a factor in their marginalization. African French
will always suffer the burden of suspicion unlike French of “other origins (Thomas 2013,
153).” According to Dominic Thomas, this idea that some are more French than other is
reinforced on the discourse and policy level.
French-African relations were conceived from the beginning in terms of cultural
and racist supremacy, and they continue to define patterns of neo-colonial domination
and exploitation that contribute directly to the very problems of destitution and
emigration France bemoans (Thomas 2013, 85).
Thomas discusses institutions under Sarkozy’s presidency and the National
Identity Debate of 2007.

He argues that the French approach to immigration is a

reflection of how the European identity and integration is conceptualized and fails to
acknowledge the relationship between European populations and non-European
populations (Thomas 2013, 69). By asserting that there is a privilege of selectivity, the
“global south” is often left out these communities and marked as “undesirable (Thomas
16 | P a g e

2013, 70).” It is this very concept of who is European and who is not that gets played on
the 2007 National Identity Debate in France. The connection between the international
regime and the national institutions is that immigrant policy affects not only migrants but
well established foreigners as well. This concept of the “other,” according to Dominic
Thomas, has evidently been ethicized and racialized in relation to non-EU communities
or third party nationals. Third party nationals often evoke the image of the southern
hemisphere; they are the migrants who don’t have the resources to contribute to society
and are held as the cause for that receiving society’s ills (Thomas 2013, 76).
Whereas Gondola and Frederick argue that race becomes the basis of this
“othering,” Nancy Foner and Richard Alba approach this “othering” from a different
standpoint: religion. The two scholars analyze a comparison study of the role of religion
in the United States and in Western Europe and the reason for which religion has a
different social and economic impact in these regions. Alba and Foner declare that the
influence of religion is dependent upon three things: the religious background of the
immigrant group, the religiosity of the native population, and the historical relationship
between the state and the immigrant population (Alba and Foner 2008, 361).
Their assertion is that Western Europe tends to have more difficulty accepting
new religions than the United States. Religion, in the case of the U.S., aids the integration
of immigrants and their descendants. Creating communities and stability, religion
becomes a passage to many socio-economic opportunities (jobs, language tutoring, and
housing) and becomes the foundation of and a method of preservation of an immigrant
group’s identity and culture (Alba and Foner 2008, 363). For the second immigrant
generation, social mobility is more attainable due to education in churches and protection
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from criminal activity. Social mobility is also more attainable given the link between
religious communities and civic engagement. Immigrants are more likely to be active
participators in the political culture of a country (Alba and Foner 2008, 364). What
allows the advantages of religion in the U.S. is the generally accepted concept that
differentiation is okay and, thus, the lack of intervention of U.S. institutions in the
development of religious immigrant populations (separate school systems) (Alba and
Fone 2008, 366). For Western Europe, the case is far from similar. Upon broaching the
topic of religion, European scholar often mention Islam, cultural difference tends to be
the center of the Western European debate on Islam (Alba and Foner 2008, 368).
The view of Islam in Europe tends to focus on how it is culturally different and
far from republican or pre-modern values. The result of this comparison is a dehumanization or demonization of Islam through various mediums (Alba and Foner 2008,
369). This perceived threat of Islam has aided in issues of cultural racism and
Muslimophobia that have been witnessed by the second generation. Their chances of
obtaining a good education and having decent representation in the labor market suffer as
a result (Alba and Foner 2008, 371). Unlike the American case, Islam faces institutional
barriers and becomes the framework of “cultural isolationism (Alba and Foner 2008,
373).”
Literature Review
While religion does have a role in both societies, Alba and Foner note that the
U.S. and Western Europe have different contexts. In the U.S. most immigrants and their
descendants are Christian; in Western Europe Islam is the majority religion of the
immigrant populations. An even more crucial element is the level of religiosity in the
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U.S. and Europe; while the United States puts great stock into religion and, more
specifically, the belief in God, Europe finds religious principle to be illegitimate (Alba
and Foner 2008, 378). In conclusion, whether a society is particularly open to religion or
not plays a crucial role in how compatible an immigrant population is in the receiving
country.
Several authors attribute this exclusion or marginalization to the role race and
culture play in the conception of European and French identity and how race and culture
is presented in public discourse. However, other researchers such as Ruud Koopmans and
Viriginie Guiradon believe that this marginalization can be connected to catalyst outside
of race and “othering.” Koopmans’s article stress that France’s assimilationist approach
to integration does not precisely denote the lack of integration of immigrant populations
(Koopmans 2010, 1). He compares European states with generous welfare systems to
those with lean, strict, or assimilationist welfare system. His comparison also takes into
account the type immigration policies of different nation-states. Through cross-national
studies, Koopmans supports his theory that states that give out heavy amount off aid and
with multiculturalist polices actually do very little to expand the social mobility of
immigrants. There is a progressive dilemma between sustaining an inclusive welfare
state with a high provision level on the one hand, and polices of multiculturalism that
facilitate immigrants’ access to welfare-state arrangements on the on the other
(Koopmans 2010, 2).
According to the author, multiculturalist policies allow immigrants to become
overly dependent on the welfare state and, thus, lead to cultural marginalization. From the
gathered data, France does moderately well in terms of equality and cultural rights in
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comparison with other EU states (Figure 1.3). Koopmans argues that excessive
accommodation of immigrants, which often does not necessitate the acquirement of the
host language above a proficient level, is ineffective towards the goal on integration
policies. The welfare state influences to a great extent the results of integration policies.
Looking at the degree to which a service is provided on the basis of “right” and the
ability of an individual to live independently of those services (de-modification),
Koopmans proclaims that there are three types of welfare states: social democratic,
liberal, and conservative (Koopmans 2010, 8). France falls into the conservative
category. The importance of the classification is that it denotes the socio-economic
mobility of immigrants.
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Figure 1.3 Ranking of European countries according to their efficiency in
approaching integration. “0” meaning (more effective handling) to “100” (lest
effective handling)
Source: Migration Policy Index Report 2015
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The author explains the manners in which the level of benefit generosity
influences social mobility: unqualified and low-educated immigrants will tend to seek out
countries the most “generous,” immigrants’ motivation to improve their social mobility
will be hindered by whether there are domestic penalties for dependency on benefits, and
the socio-economic disparity between the hosts and immigrants will be higher in
generous welfare states (Koopmans 2010, 9). Koopmans supports his assertion with data
from the International Center for Prison Studies which exhibit that the foreign population
in prisons in highest among countries with relatively lax welfare states and immigration
policies (Koopmans 2010, 19). In regard to policy, assimilationist policies encourage
immigrants to acquire the knowledge and skills to enter the labor market whereas
multiculturalist policies only increased the social divide between the host and immigrant.
The differences in policies can determine who gets to be involved in the labor market of a
European nation (Koopmans 2010, 10).
Veering away from the integration policy approach, Virginie Guiradon chooses
to focus on economic policies and the political economy the host country. She relates
how the downturn or the slowing of European economies in in the 70’s resulted in the
limited labor market participation among immigrants (Guiradon 2014, 1298). The effects
of this period have been felt by the first and second generation. She argues that this focus
on an “identity crisis” related to ethnicity leaves no room for another relevant factor that
explains more the circumstances of the second generation. Economic and demographic
differences have a considerable amount of influence on the labor market participation of
immigrants (Guiradon 2014, 1303). Guirdaon grounds her hypothesis on studies that
reflect how tax incentives, childcare availability, household size, gender, local policies
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and education determine the socio-economic mobility of immigrants and their
descendants. Concerning the education of immigrants, Guiradon states that education is
the bridge to labor market participation. Obtaining a good education is completely
dependent on location and income rather than family model or structure. For Guiradon,
this is where local policies begin to have an influence. Her claim is that immigrants who
are established in growing metropolitan labor markets are more successful than those
who try to establish themselves in local labor markets (Guiradon 2014, 1306). She
concludes, therefore, that ethnic boundaries are not as significant as economic and
institutional boundaries.
Method
Having stated the control and the empirical focus of the independent variables,
this thesis will focus on explain hoe lack of socio-economic mobility of North African
French can be due in part to the political economy: few tax incentives, inadequate access
to childcare, segregating residential policies and markets, and discriminatory
mainstreaming in education. Beyond the aspect of the political economy, my analysis of
social barriers to incorporation (laïcité and public discourse) will show that incorporation
“by validation” has failed to facilitate North African French socio-economic
advancement. The following chapters will approach my hypothesis by focusing on the
exogenous factors that privilege Southern European French over North African French.
Chapter two will explore how the political economy and differentiating demographics
disadvantage the North African second generation in their pursuit of socio-economic
success. Chapter three will focus on how public discourse and laïcité perpetuate harmful
stereotypes that stigmatize and limit North Africans to a status of “undesirable” in French
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culture. The conclusion of this thesis will focus on determining which of these variables
has the greatest impact on North African immigrant descendants in French society.
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Chapter Two: The Political Economy
The Welfare State
Discourse on the incorporation of immigrants often revolves around multicultural
policies and cultural rights. However, previous studies exhibit the role of what Koopmans
calls “benefit generosity” in the socio-economic status of immigrant descendants
(Koopmans 2010, 5). Koopmans claims that the over-generous welfare state will attract
more unskilled and lower educated immigrants. Guiradon, on the other hand, claims that
there are internal political economic barriers that hinder socio-economic advancement.
Both agree that the political economy does have an impact on the improvement of human
capital. This chapter aims to dissect the extent of this impact for Southern European and
North African French from various corners of the political economy: tax/benefit system,
childcare system, residential policies, and education structure. The incorporation of North
African French into the country’s political economy follows a different trajectory than
that of Southern European French. Through these pillars of the political economy, this
chapter will explore the socio-economic advantage and disadvantages of both groups in
comparison with socio-economic status of non-immigrant French natives.
In the four decades following the massive waves of immigration from Southern
Europe, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, immigrants encountered a series of social,
economic, and political structural obstacles. These structural obstacles accumulated into an

EU economic crisis linked with the integration crisis of the European Union in which
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immigrants and their children performed poorly in comparison to the socio-economic
success of Franco-French. Consequently, the mainstream population and politics of each
European nation depicted these under-privileged groups as economic and social burdens
(Guirdan 2014, 1298).
MIPEX reports and Rudd Koopmans’s research reflects that the French welfare state,
in comparison with those of other European Union nations, rates fairly well; France’s
welfare state has a similar trajectory to many other EU nations, however France’s
condition is still not the worst in comparison. Similar to Koopmans, Guiradon, through
her in depth research on European policies and the consequences of those policies,
claimed that the political economy is the most influential factor in the socio-economic
success of immigrants and immigrant descendants. Studies from the OECD, INED, and
other institutes reveal the structure of the welfare state in France and how far the ripple
effects of the policies extend in regard to education and labor market participation. In this
section of exogenous factors, statistics from various sources will be used to determine
whether these policies combine to disadvantage immigrant descendants in France or
adequately supply North African French with tools to increase their human capital.

Tax/Benefit System
As Guiradon mentioned, certain aspects of socio-economic mobility such as the labor
market participation of women can be linked to tax policy. The correlation between the
tax system and the socio-economic status of North African French citizens can be found
particularly in the low labor market participation of second generation North African
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French women. Social demographics such as family size are strong markers of
differences among North African French, Southern European French, and Franco-French.
These demographics result in consequences for each immigrant group concerning tax
policy. This section will explore how a tax policy that disfavors dual-earner households
effects larger than average household sizes of North African families. Through an
explanation of the French tax system, this section will demonstrate how the lack of tax
incentives for North African immigrants can lead to low labor market participation of
women and little investment in childcare facilities, the effects of which extend to the
potential academic and professional success of their children.
The tax and benefit system hold the capacity to have a significant impact on
immigrant households in France. France is one of a handful of European countries that
have joint taxation as an option for “families.” The term family references married
couples and couples with children (OECD 2015, 1). Among these countries that offer
joint taxation, Germany and France are the only two with a tax/benefit system that does
not favor dual-earner households (OECD 2015, 2). The common perception is that
families with higher incomes will pay more in taxes. However, the French tax system is
not essentially based on income as an individual but as a household. Single-earner
households in France do not contribute as much as dual-earner households in tax
payments to the government (see fig. 1).
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Figure 1. Portion of Tax Payments in French Households4
Source: OECD, Family Database, 2015

Given the nature of the tax benefit system, it is evident that this would have a
significant impact on the households of North African immigrant families which are
larger than the average native French and Southern European family. A defining
demographic between immigrant descendants of Southern European origin and North
African origin is the size of the household. For each North African family, the amount of
children to one mother is significantly larger than in a Southern European family. To be
more specific, in 2005 there was an average 5.4 children for a North African mother and
4

However, all of this information does not take into account the cost of childcare and is based on the
assumption that each family has access to informal care systems (friends, family, and neighbors) (OECD
2015, 5).
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3.9 for a Southern European mother (Okba 2012, 2).5 Furthermore, a tax system that
favors single-earning households would prove as a deterrent to the labor market
participation of either the mother or the father. According to a study from the Institut
National des Etudes Demographiques concerning the integration of immigrants into the
job market, immigrant women are more likely to be inactive than their male counterpart
(Domergue and Jourdan 2012, 34). Considering the lack of tax incentives for dual-earner
households compared to single-earners and the general large size of North African
families, North African women do not really have many encouragements to participate in
the labor market. Occupied with more children than the average in France, it would not
be beneficial financially or time-wise.

Quality and Accessibility of Childcare
Subsequently, childcare falls within the ripple effect of France’s tax benefit
system. The utilitarian value of formal childcare is the opening of employment
possibilities for the non-working parent and investment in the academic potential of the
child. Until the 1980’s childcare was considered to be informal. The government’s
decision to subsidize formal systems of childcare pushed families, immigrant and native,
to seek public and private childcare facilities. In the 1980’s, the enrollment rate of
children into head-start programs reached around 17% with family daycare as the most
popular form (OECD 2000, 132). The European Platform for Investing in Children
deems that the inclusive childcare and preschool services in France are adequate given

5

There was an average of 6.8 children for an Algerian, 4.7 for a Moroccan and Tunisian, and 3.9 for a
Southern European mother (Okba 2012, 2).
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that it is available to children as young as two months. A major benefit is the free of
charge preschools which are accessible to children between the ages of three and six
(Europa 2015). Upon taking into account the cost and types of childcare, the question
arises as to who uses which sources of childcare.6 Given that formal facilities tend to
denote more academic resources and qualified teachers/childminders, the accessibility of
formal childcare services to certain mothers influences not only a mother’s decision to
work or stay inactive but also the education attainment of the child.
The accessibility of childcare and socio-economic status of the mother and father
determines the form, informal or formal, of childcare services they will opt for. In other
words, the occupational level of the parent influences access to certain types of childcare.
In France, mothers who send their infants to crèches are often active in the labor market
(see Table 2.1).7 It is not incorrect to deduce that these women have jobs in highintermediate paying sectors such as clerical work, mid-level occupation, and
management.8 They are three times more likely to put their children in crèches than
mothers who work in sectors with menial pay (manual labor or unskilled labor) (OECD
2000, 135). The mothers who tend to occupy those remunerative jobs are mostly native
French females. The significance of these statistics regarding working mothers is to show
that women who have a superior education and a firm financial foundation have more
access to childcare which gives mothers more time to dedicate to a career and sets their
children up for academic success. While North African mothers from larger families are

6

Before the age of three, however, parents contribute 18.6% of their household incomes to childcare
services. This is a significant percentage considering that parents contribute between 14% and 38% of the
cost depending on the type of service: occasional care or a collective or family crèche. The price rises
considerably for parents who employ registered childminders (OECD 2015, 137).
7
The status of their employment stems from a high education.
8
One out of five working women who obtain secondary schooling participates in the labor market.
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limited to being inactive with little or no experience, Southern European women are dealt
a better hand that does not give them as much professional mobility as the native French
but more mobility than North African women.

Informal Care

Formal Care

Family Neighbor Other

Crèche Childminder9

Occupation of the Mother

Farming

81.1%

3.2%

0%

0%

9.7%

Craft, trade, management

51.6%

9%

13.3%

10.1%

16%

Management/supervisory10

21%

8.4%

18.1%

16.2%

36.4%

Mid-level Occupation11

27%

13.7%

6.2%

14.7%

38.5%

Administration Work 12

38.4%

11.2%

3.1%

13.5%

33.8%

Low Skilled Labor13

52%

10.9%

4.8%

5.5%

26.8%

Mother’s Choice of Childcare in Relation to Employment14
Table 2.1 Family and Neighbor Care is an aggregate of in-home and outside care.
Source: OECD, Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education, 2003

As stated beforehand, there is a correlation between childcare accessibility and
employment. The objective of the study SOCCARE, a project focused on the

9

Childminder references registered and non-registered services organized independently and are not
preoccupied with educational advancement. It is worth noting that affluent families tend to prefer
childminders capable of providing in-home services which are more expensive
10
Secondary teacher is a position that would fall under this range.
11
Mid-level occupations would include primary teachers, social workers, and employees in commerce and
administration.
12
Administration workers would be in the field of civil service, business administration, and commerce.
13
Low skilled labor would fall in the domain of industrial work and unskilled work.
14
This table concerns children under three years old.
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organization of social care among families in Europe, was to analyze the structural,
socio-economic, and demographic changes in Europe and families of various
backgrounds: lone parent, dual earner households, and immigrant families.15 Full-time
employment is high among females in France compared to part-time employment
(Kröger 2003, 6). This indicates the probability that women with lower income are
inclined to stay inactive when family size, taxes, and childcare accessibility is taken into
account. Another factor of employment is employer flexibility. Women who maintained
full-time employment often benefited from medium to high flexibility in hours or leave in
relations to the status of their employment (Kröger 2003, 6).
According to the report, the higher the qualification of the individual, the more
“family friendly” or flexible the individual’s employment can be (Kröger 2003, 7). This
designates that these parents can afford more hours of childcare services and have jobs
that are willing to concede to “unsocial and atypical working hours” (Kröger 2003, 7).
The case is the exact opposite for parents coming out of low income situations and
menial pay jobs. Immigrants, who dominate the supply of unskilled or manual labor, tend
to be more preoccupied with “extensive cost delegation and leaving the children alone,”
or the mother often choses to cut her work hours in order to look after the children
(Kröger 2003, 9). Among the immigrants who hold skilled professions (most of whom
are of European descent), there is an emphasis on “medium to high extensive delegation”
meaning they are more likely to choose external childcare (Kröger 2003, 9). Depth
findings concerning families of African origin show that these families are more disposed

15

This report gathered information concerning female full time/ part-time employment, paternal
participation in childcare, and employer flexibility.

31 | P a g e

to mother-centered childcare arrangements.16 This includes dual-earner households in
which the mother either partially or completely cuts back her hours (Kröger 2003, 64).
This report specifies the impact of the accessibility of childcare on the professional
opportunities and decisions of first generation parents. These parents are essentially role
models for the second generation. The likelihood of the parent(s) to be employed in
unskilled labor decreases professional mobility of their children given that they would not
have much cultural and economic capital (Aebehardt 2015, 573).
The domino effect of the infrastructure of the childcare system extends to
education as well. It can be expected that parents take into account the quality of the
childcare that they choose for their children. Unfortunately, this is not the only criteria.
As in any country, high quality childcare, childcare the renders educational services,
costs more than childcare that is simply concerned with childminding. Even though the
government aims to subsidize childcare, aiding kids in becoming more academically
competitive in the future is not always the first priority. The minimal amount of care is
often acceptable. This bare minimum increases the price value of childcare that not only
focuses on childminding but also enhancing the social and academic skills of children.
The effect then follows a pattern similar to employment rates. Only families (often native
French and sometimes Southern European) can benefit from a majority of these highly
sought after services (OECD 2000, 133). Consequently, parents lay out a blueprint for
their children’s futures.17

16

This estimation includes families of North African, West African, and Central African origin.
Among Southern European immigrant children (between the ages of 20 and 35) who received their
primary education in France, only 33 percent of men and 25 percent of women are without a diploma
above brevet. Among North African immigrant children, only 41 percent of men and 37 percent of women
are without a high level diploma (Brinbaum 2012, 47).
17
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Impact of Residential/Housing Policies on the Housing Market

Similar to tax policy, French residential/housing market has been shown to be a
physical representation of its striated society. The banlieus and zones d’education
prioritaires signify the peripheral of French society, immigrants of under-developed or
developing countries. The residential housing market and the distribution of France’s
population within this system have economic as well as educational consequences. By
zooming in on the residential market and policies, this section will illustrate the manner
in which wealth is concentrated outside of ZEP, banlieus, and CUS zones. North African
immigrants and their children are characteristically linked to these socio-economically
weak areas. I will explore how residential policies and structures contribute to the poor
academic success rate and the lack of professional opportunities of North African
descendants.
Similar to residential patterns in several other developed countries, the residential
background has residual effects on the labor market participation and education
attainment of any individual regardless of ethnicity. Controlling for ethnicity allows the
magnification of the importance of income and social status of the family of a student. As
to be expected, there is a gap in terms of the quality of education available, academic
success, and access to moderately remunerative employment. Upon taking into the
account country of origin of these students, it is evident from previous research that the
gap widens further among native French, Southern European French, and North African
French students.
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The issue concerning residential policies and the housing market is often met with
the argument that residential segregation and the low labor market participation of certain
immigrant groups is a result of their tendency to favor interaction with those who look as
they do. Guiradon researches the issue in a comparison study of immigrants’ labor
participation rate cross-locally in the same country. The consequences of local dynamics
in post-industrial cities outweigh the drawback of ethnicity. More specifically, a lack of
labor market participation cannot be solely attributed the propensities of the individual to
associate or interact with others “just like them” (Guiradon 2014, 1306). Therefore, I
expect to draw from my research the conclusion that the socio-economic barriers within
certain locales hold a greater weight than the “choice” of immigrant descendants to live
among the same ethnicity.
In France there is an apparent strong concentration of certain populations in
certain “quartiers” characterized by wealth, lack of income, and the ethnic groups that
live in these areas. These quartiers are often referenced as the quartier “huppés” and
“ghettos” (Ké Shon 2011, 1). A majority of French public housing is found in urban areas
or on the outskirts of urban cities. The 1960’s and 1970’s of France saw waves of
immigrants relocating from Southern Europe, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria settle in a
majority of France’s public housing (Verdugo 2011, 10).18 To restrict attempts at
permanent resettlement the French government severely limited immigrants’ access to
housing projects. As a result, many immigrants (mostly males) lived in slums on the
outskirts of urban areas. During the late 1970’s, the French government loosened

18

Until the middle of the 1970’s, French national authority considered the immigration of African
immigrants to be temporary, and the government explicitly discourage family reunification which would
lead to permanent settlement (Verdugo 2011, 11).
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restrictions on immigrants and granted more access to public housing facilitating family
reunification (Verdugo 2011, 11).19 Nevertheless, the typical quality of this “new”
housing was relatively low. Quality was traded in to accommodate a large population;
therefore, tall apartment complexes with living quarters insufficient for the usual
immigrant families that inhabited them (Bourdon 2007). These became to be known as
“taudis” or HLM (habitations à loyer modèré).
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19

It was not until la Loi de Debré and Vivien that the French government attempted to find a solution to
the miserable living conditions, also called bidonvilles, in urban areas.
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In the latter half of the 1990’s, some of these areas became ZUS areas, zones
urbaines sensibles, or CUS, contrat urbain de cohesion. Ridden with high rates of
unemployment, poor economic activity, and low income rates, these zones became a
priority for the French government (Aeberhardt 2015, 573).20 As one would suspect,
North African immigrant descendants compared to Southern Europeans immigrant
descendants were heavily over-represented in these areas. From 1968 this opening of the
housing market to immigrants revealed macro-segregation across urban areas. Figure 2.2
exhibits immigrant access to private and public housing in urban areas with a population
greater than 50,000 and neighborhood segregation in 1968 and 1999 (Verdugo 2011,
20).21 The statistics relate a large percentage of immigrants in public housing in 1999,
18.2%, and in 1968, 14.1%. Their share in public housing is greater than their share in
private housing. On average, European immigrants who take up residence in public
housing tend to do so in areas with fewer immigrants. To be more specific, in 1968
European immigrants (Italians, Portuguese, and Spanish) had the tendency to live in
“census tracts” where Southern Europeans composed 10 percent (highest of all immigrant
groups in 1968) of the population even though the general populations consisted of only 2
percent Southern Europeans. This was the case in 1999; the lowest record of segregation,
2 percent, among immigrant groups belonged to Southern Europeans. Although indexes
of segregation decreased between 1968 and 1999 for North African immigrants,
residential segregation was still higher than that for Southern European immigrants
(Verdugo 2011, 21). Figure 2.2 reinforces the fact that general macro-level segregation

20

2,500 ZUS and CUS zones were designated at the establishment of this system.
The indexes demonstrate that all immigrants made up 8.63% and 10.12% of the total population in
France in 1968 and 1999, respectively (Verdugo 2011, 20).
21
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declined over the course of time but distribution of European and non-European
immigrants in public and private housing persisted.
The divide in the housing market is attributable to a few factors: poor distribution
of infrastructure, lack of public transports and services, and blatant disparities in the
education system (Aeberhardt 2015, 568). The previous section mentioned income levels
and employment status of immigrant groups and proved the connection between low
incomes levels and access to certain services. Therefore, it is deducible that minority
groups with low income levels are more dependent upon public transportation services
(Aeberhardt 2015, 570). Access to public transportation is dependent upon which area an
immigrant family chooses to live in, and some urban zones are situated too far from
centers making public transportation unavailable or inadequate. Furthermore, housing
complexes or public housing is usually constructed in manner that leaves urban zones on
the periphery (cite radieuse).22 These areas were built for families that could not afford
the average cost of living of city centers. As to be expected, poorly built houses meant
poorly paved roads and lack of various adequate resources and facilities (Dubarle 2002,
198). This information shows how these urban zones lack resources that would be
conducive to the socio-economic mobility of its residents.
Housing policies in France have proved to be just as insufficient as residential
planning in relation to the education provided for the younger generation. A main
objective of French housing policies is to maintain or advocate social cohesion. The
Social Cohesion Plan was designed to diminish the disparity between social groups and

22

This was a direct consequence of national and international migration.
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regions (Dubarle 2002, 182).23 Furthermore, past and current urban polices aim to
diversify social housing. Often the promotion of a social mixture falls behind given the
conflict between priorities: providing affordable housing to families in precarious
situations and remaining within financial constraints (Dubarle 2002, 203).

The

effectiveness of such policies can be determined by statistics regarding the distribution of
immigrants in the public and private housing market.
The effects of macro-level segregation, similar to the tax/benefit system and the
availability of childcare, on the second generation manifest in the education attainment
and labor market participation of immigrant children. Furthermore, the concentration of
immigrants in certain zones proves to be one of the many facets of the explanation for the
outcomes characterize, or rather, stigmatize immigrant groups in France (Aeberhardt
2015, 568). Among non-immigrant men 4.3% of the mainstream population (16, 032)
completed their education in a ZUS or CUCS. The percentage was 29.1% for minorities
(1, 4389). Taking into account gender divisions, women reflected the same pattern.
Approximately 5% of the non-immigrant French female population was located in a ZUS
or CUCS upon completion of their education; this is a stark contrast to the 28.9% of
minority women who came out of disadvantaged zones. There are two processes going on
that hinder the socio-economic mobility of the second generation immigrants:
socialization in these disadvantage zones and concentration of efficient educational
resources outside of these areas.
Factoring in residential location and the socio-economic demographics of the
Southern Europeans and North African second generation, there is evidence of “territorial
23

Usually these policies call for financial support of these ZUS and CUS areas (Dubarle 2002, 203).

38 | P a g e

inequality of educational provision” (Aebeharft 2015, 570). By educational provision,
this study is referencing the quality of the teaching, the experience and background of
professors, the financial support of the school, the academic resources available to
students through the school, and the number of students per class. ZUS and CUS zones
are stigmatized as zones lacking the essential resources. There is a correlation between
neighborhood socialization and a child’s academic success. There are consequences of
educational underachievement being concentrated within a certain urban zone. The
minority students in these priority zones grow to recognize how academic achievement in
highly concentrated within certain areas and ethnic groups, and they normalize this
systematic underachievement. According to Aeberhardt’s research, this “trigger effect” is
the normalization of academic underperformance among one’s peers (Aebehardt 2015,
569). If an individual is not surrounded by models of academic or professional success
within his or her ethnic community, the possibility of “failure” becomes greater.
An aspect of Aeberhardt’s “trigger effect” is “postcode discrimination.”
“Postcode discrimination” occurs when individuals are stigmatized by their quartiers.
This stigmatization persists in a manner in which those who mature in locales where a
large portion of the residents are unemployed, not wealthy, and not actively looking for
employment have a more difficult time moving out from under the stigma of economic
and professional failure. The demographics of these families are not conducive for setting
an example of professional and academic success for the children. In these zones
sensibles, mothers are often unemployed or inactive, and fathers are either unemployed or
employed in manual labor. At the origin level, the employment gap between mainstream
and North African women is especially wide. Nearly six percent of Maghrebi women are
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inactive, whereas only approximately three percent of mainstream women do not have
and are not looking for employment (Aebehardt 2015, 573). It is not surprising that first
generation North African mothers are more likely to be unemployed. The employment
gap is significant; approximately 64 percent of non-immigrant French parents were
employed according to Aebehardt’s study. Meanwhile, employment for North African
parents was recorded to be approximately 28.5 percent.
Given that research shows that North African origin children come from families
less socially and economically prominent than those of Southern European origin
children, it is not a stretch to assume that the areas in which these Maghrebi families can
afford to live in do not often have efficient resources or adequate infrastructure: adequate
school system, recreational centers, and public transportation. Although both immigrant
groups peaked within the same two decades, 1960’s to 1970’s, Italians, Portuguese, and
Spanish were usually able to find better employment. Thus, it is deducible that this
particular set had an average income higher than those from Maghreb.
On average, students with Moroccan, Tunisian, or Algerian heritage drop out
more frequently than their French-born and Southern European peers (Aeberhardt 2015,
573). However, women of all origins generally drop-out less frequently than their male
counterpart.24 For those children of North African parents who go on to complete their
education and obtain a baccalaureate, there is dissimilarity in the types of baccalaureate
that they achieve. North African origin females are more likely to obtain a tertiary
baccalaureate while men are more successful with industrial baccalaureates (Aebehardt

24

In fact, by just comparing all immigrant women to French male students and controlling for social origin,
research shows that even immigrant women are doing almost as well in relation to drop-out rates
(Aebehardt 2015, 580).
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2015, 574). The limits of the educational provisions most likely set these children on the
vocational tract. Among those minorities dropped out in 2004, 27 percent came from a
zone urbaine sensible or a contrat urbain sensible. Only six percent of mainstream
children that completed their education came from these areas (Aebehardt 2015, 573
Although this data relates to a more recent time period and, therefore, a younger portion
of the second generation, factors influencing education and the structure of education in
France have not changed so much that applying the conclusion of this data to the old
portion of the second generation would be fallible. Consequently, there is a correlation
between residence in a ZUS and CUS zone and the academic underperformance of
students, more specifically immigrant students.
In conclusion, the public and private housing market has established certain social
and economic boundaries for certain ethnic groups. Research on the second generation
proves that residential policies have allowed these boundaries to persist and perpetuate
the marginalization of immigrants and their children. These boundaries have come to
shape the quality of education that an individual has access to and the social network that
influences their advancement or stagnation in society. Although, first generation
immigrants generally do move away from these “distressed areas” over the years, African
immigrants are more likely than non-European immigrants to stay in these distressed
zones (Verdugo 2011, 6). It is evident that social background and residential location can
only be applied as a facet of the explanation regarding the lack of socio-economic
mobility of North African second generation compared to Southern European immigrant
descendants. From Aebehardt, Okba, and Verdugo’s research, there is a trend. However,
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a causal effect cannot be firmly substantiated. The extent of the influence of
discriminatory mechanisms remains in question.

Mainstreaming and Structure of Education

Education is significant in that it is overall responsible for the socialization of
children during their adolescent or developmental years. The structure or character of this
particular institution is a marker of the extent of integration of immigrant descendants.
According to Amanda Garret’s article in the Journal of Political Science, a country’s
education system is a mirror of the national model, its “structural and ideological
characteristics” (Garrett 2005, 26). Although education has been previously discussed as
an outcome of policies, this section focuses on the structure of education itself and its
influence on socio-economic mobility. Consequences from a lack of resources in
underprivileged quartiers, ill-equipped teachers in CUS or ZEP zones, and the
mainstreaming of education influences the education attainment of children as well. The
structure of French education is not adaptable to the needs of immigrant parents and,
consequently, penalizes the minority second generation. This section magnifies how
social division materializes in the assimilationist foundation of the education system and
schools’ methods of mainstreaming minority students. Studies show that minorities are
more often than not pushed onto a precarious route of low income jobs and poor
academic performance.
The institution of education is essential in integration in that it helps immigrant
descendants reconcile the ethnic and geographic origins of their parents with the culture
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they were born into (Garrett 2005, 5). Koopmans relates how France, in comparison with
other countries, tends to rely on policies and institutions that are less “generous” or
multiculturalist. The model of the pays d’accueil exemplifies more assimilationist
principles, and the concept of republican assimilation is present in its education system.
This system in relation to immigration and integration is founded on the participation in
the individual as “a French person” and the full immersion into French culture and
language (Garrett 2005, 5). Is the foundation of this institution conducive for facilitating
the social and economic incorporation of the North African second generation?
The French education system privileges the concept of a uniform environment in
which, ideally, any child, regardless of social or economic background, can receive the
same quality of education. Those in “vulnerable” situations would have the opportunity
to receive adequate education as those in less vulnerable situations (Garrett 2005, 11).25
The French government aspired to create an institution that relied on meritocracy more
than aristocracy and to push closer to an egalitarian education system.
The structure of the French education system is very simple. Primary school is
available to all, and children’s performance is supervised.26 It is at the age of 15 that
students are given the responsibility of determining their educational and professional
route. Through an examination students are placed on one of two trajectories: lycée to
study for the baccalauréat and vocational training. If a student achieves the route of
lycée, continued examinations and obtainment of the bacc opens the opportunity of
placement in a classe préparatoire and, then, the possibility of acceptance into one of
25

First, the education system is centralized meaning that both public and private schools function under
the regulations and standards imposed by the French government (Garrett 2005, 11).
26
Although there are no exit exams from primary schooling, a pupil’s monitored progress is recorded and
sent on to a secondary school (Garrett 2005, 13).
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France’s grandes écoles (Garrett 2005, 13). This route opens access to France’s high
status and high paying jobs. Thus, the vocational route is not the ideal of any student.
During the vocational route, students work toward a certificate d’aptitdue professionelle
which would give access to an entry level job or a vocational baccalaureate. This very
program has been criticized due to its lack of efficiency in regard to the occupational
progression of immigrants and their children (Safi 2014, 14).
France has taken measures to diminish the education disparity among different
ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds. During the 1980’s, zones d’éducation
prioritaires were established to support schools in generally disadvantaged areas. Even
though France has invested in a plan to combat this academic inequality, this investment
has not proved to be very efficient in the same way as the vocational programs when one
takes into account the ethnic divide. The fissure between native French and the
“immigrant French” is still apparent (OECD 2008, 5).
The establishment of priority education areas was intended
to correct these and other inequalities by allocating
financial resources and staff to encourage smaller class
sizes and provide specific support programmes in
disadvantaged schools, which are identified, in part,
according to the share of students of foreign origin.
However, evaluations of this positive support have
concluded that the impact is uncertain (Kurzbaum 2009,
41).

Despite attempts to resolve this recurring issue, mainstreaming methods of school
administrations, regional segregation, and the parents’ lack of knowledge of the French
education system and lack of education in general is still an issue. To perform an analysis
on these variables or obstacles, studies on regional school systems will be used to observe
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the student population. Previous research has pointed to the high concentration of
immigrant students in some of the worst schools.27 A study by Felouzis on schools in the
Bordeaux region concluded that levels of segregation on the basis of ethnic origin are
much higher than segregation based on social class and/or educational success
(Kurzbaum 2009, 32). The study included an aggregate of young adults as old as 35 and
at the end of their “initial education” (Aeberhardt 2015, 571). Only 4.45% of native
French received their education in these priority zones whereas 29% of immigrant
children received their education in these areas (Aeberhardt 2015, 574). Within the
immigrant group there is an even greater gap between North African origin and
Portuguese children, 37 percent and 12 percent, respectively (Kurzbaum 2009, 40).
Through the regional distribution of ethnicities in schools, French schools generally tend
to reinforce and emphasize divisions based on origin: French vs immigrant and European
vs. non-European immigrant.

Parents, native and immigrant, seek out the maximum opportunities for their
children and do so by attempting to sidestep residential restrictions (Kurzbaum 2009, 40).
The expectations and wishes of the parents drive the education market, and the
relationship among the immigrant portion of a school’s population, the reputation of an
academy, and the plans of the parents is apparent. Parents have preconceived notions of
competitive schooling, and schools respond to this by streaming or selection procedures
that do not inhibit segregation. For example, a school administration will direct certain
students to low-performance courses. Immigrant descendant students are often the target

27

These immigrants were particularly of North African, Sub-Saharan African and Turkish origin (Kurzbaum
2009, 33
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of this method. This is done to prevent the loss of the “best students” to other private or
public schools with possibly better reputations (Kurzbaum 2009, 41). The combination of
parental strategy, streaming, selection methods for special courses all have a direct
impact on the attainment of education and the quality of the education of immigrant
descendants.
Unfortunately, the support of the parents is not enough to ensure the success of
their children. Educational segregation by post code and administration, ZEP’s, and
vocational programs reflect how the education system is ineffective in the promotion of
the social and economic advancement. The dropout rate for second generation
immigrants is twice that of native French in secondary French education. The children of
immigrants are more likely to take the vocational route (Kurzbaum 2009, 37). Similar to
the trajectory of North African immigrant children, Portuguese children exhibit high
dropout rates as well as an inclination for the vocational route. However, second
generation male North African immigrants prove to be less successful on the vocational
tract and encounter more obstacles. These vocational careers often do not fit the
professional aspirations of North African males. In the case of Portuguese immigrants,
these children gain greater access to careers fitting their aspirations after training
programs or stages (Kurzbaum 2009, 37).
It is simply not enough to measure the types and obtainment of degrees, but the
kinds of opportunities available to these students should also be taken into account. Thus,
measuring unemployment rates in accordance with education level should be a marker to
determine whether the French education system has a crippling effect on North African
immigrant descendants. For the purpose of reflecting the mobility of each regional
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ethnicity, Portuguese and Moroccans will stand representative of the Southern European
and North African second generation, respectively. The unemployment rate of Portuguese
immigrants (18-40 years old) in 1999 was relatively equal to that of French immigrants
(Simon 2003, 1111). Taking into account the level of education did not produce
unexpected results. Among those who dropped out, approximately 48% of Moroccans
and 22.65% of Portuguese were unemployed in 1999. For those who chose the vocational
tract, the Portuguese second generation had the lowest unemployment rate while
Moroccans had the highest. Even Moroccans with a baccalaureate had an unemployment
rate twice that of Portuguese with a baccalaureate as well (Simon 2003, 1112).
Portuguese tend to be more concentrated in construction and trade jobs. Thus, this
Portuguese niche serves as an advantage in that the second generation can rely on family
and peer connections to gain entry into the job market. This is not the case for Moroccans
who do not really have strong ethnic or peer ties in a particular market (Simon 2003,
1114).
Observation of the French education system and the performance of North African
and Southern European immigrant groups in the labor market and collèges establish that
the structure the French institution does not work efficiently and perpetuates the ethnic
and economic boundaries that are permitted by other policies and structures: residential
structures and tax/benefit policies.
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Involuntary Inheritance of Socio-economic Mobility

Some scholars have argued that the lack of educational success of immigrants
compared to French natives stems from the parental support and how their peers and/or
family value education. The French education stems places a lot of importance in the
participation of the parents in the academic growth of their children (OECD 2008, 5).
Assistance with homework and simple motivation are essential. However, this aspect of
education can be limited according to the parents’ educational background. The division
between aspirations and realization is a tense subject especially for North African parents
and their children. This division is amplified in school systems through the limited
cultural and educational capital of the parents and their unfamiliarity with the French
system. This occurs through the parents’ often limited knowledge of French which leads
to awkward interaction with the schools (Kurzbaum 2009, 31).

Because the unemployment rates among fathers of North
African origin are three times the rates among their
Portuguese counterparts and because most of the mothers
are not economically active, the families are limited in their
ability to use networks to help their offspring gain access to
the labor market (Kurzbaum 2009, 47).

Social reproduction theorists argue that the possibility of academic success is
reliant upon the social characteristics of the immigrant parents, and these characteristics
are usually negative. The lack of education of the parent(s) and their type of job can
influence the education trajectory of the children (Kurzbaum 2009, 38). However,
immigrant children, who started and finished their education in France, generally do fair
better than their parents. This can be attributed to the increased interests of their parents
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in their education (Simon 2003, 1107). Immigrant parents tend to uphold high
expectations or aspirations for their children. Kurzbaum argues that these aspirations tend
to surpass those of native French parents of the same social class (Kurzbaum 2009, 38).
For immigrant parents who are completely invested in the education of their children, the
education system usually should manage to aid their social mobility (Simon 2003, 1108).
Even though personal choices should be taken into account to explain the general
low employment rate and high employment in menial careers, residential segregation
combined with the socio-economic status of peers and family have much influential
power on second generation immigrants. Socio-economic mobility, therefore, becomes
more of an involuntary inheritance. If the likelihood of the mother being employed and
the father maintaining employment in heavy manual labor is great, there is an increased
possibility that their children will possess low economic and cultural capital (Aebehardt
2015, 573). This is apparent from DARES analysis of the link between the type of
employment of an immigrant father and the type of employment of the son and/or
daughter.28 Consideration of the working-class origin becomes important when analyzing
North African and Southern European immigrants. DARES analysis supports previous
findings regarding the employments status of two immigrant groups. Algerian fathers are
50% more likely to be non-qualified workers while Southern European fathers are as
likely to be qualified (Okba 2012, 2). The majority French population was more often
employed as clerical or sales workers. Only 28.1 percent of male (28.3 percent for
female) immigrant descendants declared that his or her father was a clerical/sales

28

This analysis studies descendants between the ages of 35 and 50 who were born in France to foreign
born immigrant parents.
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employee. Minority parents were more likely to be employed in manual labor: 42.7
percent for men and 47.2 percent for women (Aebehardt 2015, 575).
The second generation, thereafter, encounters many difficulties in professional
advancement and access to employment. The daughters of North African parents spend
approximately twice as much time finding their first job as the majority population; it
takes a North African descendant female 2.5 years. This is less than the time for a French
female, 1.3 years, and Southern European female, 1.3 years. The gap widens even further
in the time it takes a female of each origin to find stable employment: 2.1, 0.9, and 1.0
years, respectively (Okba 2012, 3). While the time to access a “first job” varies, not all
North African second generation girls are successful. Only 67 percent of women (79
percent for men) succeed in finding stable employment whereas 80 percent of Southern
European women (90 percent for men) are successful. The pattern repeats itself in
relations to years of unemployment and inactivity. Three years after individuals of the
sample completed their education research revealed that North African children were
more often unemployed than the majority population (Aebehardt 2015, 573). These
statistics are not solely dependent on the socio-economic status of the parent. The level of
education and limited or lacks of social connections are factors that should be taken into
account and can be linked to residential location.
Analysis of previous research focused on the pattern among parents with poor
social and economic capital and the socio-economic mobility of their children reinforces
the concept that one’s parents in particular have an influence over the professional
advancement of the children. The professional mobility of immigrant descendants is
measured according to two indexes: mobility across different socio-professional
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categories (ouvrière, employé; profession intermédiaire, cadre) and mobility between
qualified and non-qualified jobs (Okba 2012, 4). Generally, females across all immigrant
groups experience more difficulty achieving mobility. It is intriguing, however, that this
limited advancement of North African men is no greater than that of the second
generation of Southern European females. While only 17 percent of second generation
North African men succeed in attaining higher employment status than that of their
fathers, Southern European women encounter the same level of difficulty. In summary,
an individual’s access to adequate education (above Bac+3 or a Bac in general) and the
professional models in his or her immediate environment can have a favorable or
unfavorable influence on the professional success of immigrant children.
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Chapter Three: Incorporation by Validation
By analyzing the political economy of a country, it is possible to designate the
causes of socio-economic stagnation in relation to demographic patterns within a group.
However, Gondola, among other scholars, asserts that the creation of ethnic peripheries
in French society is due in part to the conflict of historical racism (colonialism),
“semantic representation,” and the media-generated perception of black and beur
(Gondola 2009, 147). Gondola titles this stereotyping and active marginalization of the
blacks and beurs born in France by the “invisible” French as “othering.” This invisibility
is the privilege of not being stigmatized as an outsider based on ethnicity or religion. This
term will be used throughout this chapter to indicate the active cultural exclusion of
North African immigrant descendants through various means: laïcité and public
discourse. This chapter will outline as well how Southern European descendants and
native French inherit this invisibility on the basis of the inconspicuousness of their
ethnicity and majority religion.
To broach the subject of the politicization of black and beur, a comprehensive
outline of the French model of incorporation should serve as the foundation of this
chapter. In this way, “othering” can be understood as having an origin. The French model
of incorporation renders much control to the state over immigration affairs and, more
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specifically, the integration of immigrants.29 In other words, integration in France is set
up to occur at the national level. A significant consequence of this construction is the
absence of middle institutions that would inevitably lead to the creation of collective or
group identities. The French have a term for this: communaurtarisme (Garrett 2005, 9).30
France places ample importance on the incorporation of the individual immigrant. The
most common case in point of France’s ideals is the country’s reluctance to collect or
include ethnic data in studies.31 This reflects how the French state in regard to integration
works under the “assumption that all individuals can and should be recognized as
uniformly equal with respect to the state” (Garrett 2005, 9). How does the rejection of
communities link to equality and uniformity under the eyes of the state? The French
model relies on assimilation which creates obstacles for immigrants. These barriers
challenged and debated through the channels of secularism and public discourse. This
chapter on laïcité and public discourse will exhibit the manner in which visible ethnicity
and religion continue to come into conflict with France’s reliance on assimilation as a
method of incorporation.

Laïcité
What becomes of those who are not perceived to be assimilated according to the
mainstream population? The fact behind “othering” is that it disregards whether or not
29

Consequently, the manner in which France’s incorporation model is construed creates a direct link
between immigrants’ access to institutions and the power of the State (Garrett 2009, 8).
30
The English translation of this French term is the promotion of communities, which are often immigrant
communities that do not fit the French idea of unification and egalitarianism (Garrett 2009, 8).
31
The French state does not officially or legally note neither ethnic nor racial identities of its inhabitants.
It is very difficult (nearly impossible) to find French data that denotes the ethnicity or race of the subjects
surveyed (Garrett 2009, 9).
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the immigrant or immigration heir, the immigrant descendant, views himself or herself as
having successfully integrated into French society and culture. An individual’s “feeling”
of strong cultural ties with French society and their ethnic origin culture becomes
irrelevant in the incorporation process leaving the incorporation in the hands of the
invisible majority. Laïcité, or secularism, as a concept became over time a tool of
marginalization in France.
Although the progress towards the separation of church and state began much
earlier (18th century), secularism did not come into conflict with ethnicity until the late
19th century. The Ancien Régime of France rested, for the most part, on “monarchic
religion” and the overarching power of the church. The superiority and authority of the
Church during the revolutionary period of France did not coincide with objectives of the
democratic revolutions sweeping Europe in the 18th century (Garrett 2005, 11). In brief,
laïcité depended upon three ideological pillars: neutrality, religious liberty, and pluralism.
The secularization of the French state required that all public service be neutral to
religious opinions. However, French secularism does not simply boil down to state
neutrality and tolerance; the state is obligated to reconcile religious liberty with public
order. Finally, pluralistic French secularism specifies that each religion has a right to
expression, and no religion should have a monopoly over the state (Garrett 2005, 20). It
was not until 1882 with the establishment of the Law of Jules Ferry that secularism
penetrated the French school system firmly separating religious doctrine from school
curriculum. The gap of religion was filled by the teaching of patriot values or rather “the
religion of the fatherland.” Geared to focus on Republican and civic values, the French
education system took on secularism as a mode of uniformity (Garrett 2005, 12). In 1905,
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the French state deemed that there would not be public recognition of religious
communities in the public space. The conflicts among these three values and the
expression of religion in the public space are precisely where secularism becomes a tool
of differentiation and exclusion.
The Affaire du Foulard of 1989 was the culmination of an incorporation system
that relies on othering and secularism. It continues to polarize French society into two
camps: catholic European and non-Europeans. In 1989, three Muslim female students
were denied entry to a Crèil junior high school on the grounds of their headscarves. This
scandal brought to the forefront of the secular state the challenges of laïcité and whether
or not this law, created to prevent the exclusion, was, in retrospect, a law of exclusion.
The hijab scandal revolved around two opposing sides: permit headscarves in public
schools or prohibit the wearing of such religious symbols. The French minister of
education reaffirmed the views of the French government by stating that the wearing of
headscarves is inconsistent with the values of secularism and presents an obstacle to the
objective of a uniform state.
If racism can be defined as a system of thought and
discriminatory practice founded on “race,” “origin,”
“ethnicity,” or “culture,” then the anti-headscarf law is
indisputably racist, because it establishes a glaring
inequality. By banning the headscarf in the classroom, it
directs violence against Sikhs and veiled Muslims, but cast
a blind eye toward Christians who wear a cross under their
sweaters (Tévanian 2009, 194).

Although France does not take national religious censuses, the Catholic
population in France was estimated to be approximately 37.9 million or 60% of the
population in 2010. In addition, Southern European countries are traditionally Catholic
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with an average Muslim population of 2.03% (Wormald 2013).32 Even though the
number of self-identified Catholics has declined over the years, values and social codes
that have root in Catholicism have been institutionalized in secular laws and policies. A
new form of religious politics that emphasizes social order has emerged since the
twentieth century. Religious politics in France proclaims to accept diversity but only if it
submits to its democratic liberal principles. These principles not only require respect for
practical rules of civil democracy but for moral values with ties in liberal philosophy as
well. An example of this would be the concept of gender equality (Portier 2012, 13).
These principles have been integrated into the French identity. Coming from traditionally
Catholic countries, the Southern European second generation does not encounter conflict.
The native French do not penalize the Southern Europeans for their immigrant origins
due to their EU status and the perception that French values epitomize European values.
One can anticipate the conflicts that arise between a Muslim individual and liberal French
society.
French secularism has become synonymous with assimilation. Its application in
the public space implies a process that veers away from the idea of multiculturalism.
Assimilation requires individuals to conform to the mainstream culture, the native
culture. Assimilation is not only about the “foreigner” feeling as if they are almost a
native but also about the native feeling that the foreigner belongs within his/her society
(Gondola 2009, 13).

National discourse concerning the model of the French state

generally arises regarding Muslim immigrants of North African origin (Garrett 2009, 20).
Why are Muslims so strongly implicated in the debate on French secularism while

32

The study by the Pew Research Center included those who self-identified as Catholic (Wormald 2013).
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Southern Europeans are not? Aside from its religious dominance in France (second to
Catholicism), Islam is the only predominant religion in France that could most notably
disrupt the status quo given the cultural and religious identities attached to it.
Furthermore, second and third generation Muslims (les Français de sol) in particular are
perceived to have either fully assimilated or not. The possibility of their insufficient
assimilation or perceived lack of immersion into the French identity is assumed to be a
threat to the French model of social uniformity. Southern Europeans do not pose a threat
given their “shared experience” and common values with the French as simply Europeans
(Garrett 2005, 20). The possibility of their insufficient assimilation and their semblance
as an “alternative to French secularism” and has led to “othering” which can be summed
up to the extensive fear and suspicion by the catholic French society (Garrett 2005,21).
As to be expected, this classification of Muslim as being “not one of us”
subsequently leads to feelings of alienation or a sense of not belonging from the
perspective of second generation North Africans (Garrett 2005, 21). This is exactly what
happens when secularism shifts from egalitarian, libertarian secularism to sectarian
secularism (Tévanian 2009, 194). Secularism sets up an institution that penalizes those
whose differences are “too” apparent. In this form it is a concept that goes beyond the
workings of religious institutions and the French state, it extends into the social domain
as well. When these secularist republican ideals extend into the social sphere, ethnicities
are either paralleled (to an extent) or polarized. The perception that Islam encroaches on
the French/European model is a result of this polarization, and the hijab is a perfect
example of how Islam and Muslims are differentiated from the French model. Religious
independence is perceived as a threat to the norm (Garrett 2009, 24). There is evidence of
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the Muslim identity being equated with oppression of women although some Muslim
women have voiced that for them headscarves are not a symbol of male dominance over
their lives but an appreciation of their identity and autonomy (Garrett 2005, 29). The
view of the hijab or burka as “oppressive” in relation to other religious symbols is just
one of the many ways in which Muslims are portrayed as the “other,” or apart from
French.
In the domain of education, laïcité maintains significance for the North African
population. Education as an institution embodies the ideology of the French national
model. Garret asserts that comprehension of secularism in the education system assists in
understanding the relationship between the national model and the incorporation of
Muslim immigrants (Garrett 2005, 26).
Therefore, the character of educational integration can be
considered an important indicator of the future integration
of these Muslim groups in terms of language mastery,
socio-economic position, and feelings of social inclusion
(Garrett 2005, 26).

French education relies on the equal treatment of all students no matter his or her origins.
It is for the purpose of equality that the French government advocates for uniformity
(Garrett 2005, 12). The secularism in public schools emphasizes the purpose of
minimalizing the inequalities that are present outside of the school system and facilitate
social advancement based on meritocracy. The use of secularism to undermine cultural
difference creates a public model founded on what Garret calls “a formidable
assimilationist machine” (Garrett 2005, 13).
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The set-up of the French education requires Muslims to abandon their “identity” in
order to adapt (Garrett 2005, 27). The conflict between secularism and public schools
creates a sense of inherent rejection by the French state of Muslim bodies which is
manifested in the headscarf disputes. In French society, the foulard denotes a distinctive
marker of difference among students and citizens (Garrett 2005, 28). There is no
distinctive marker for Southern Europeans nor is there one that comes into conflict with
“European values” or the “European identity.” Although there seems to be no conflict
with individuals wearing a cross, Islamic representation such as the headscarf is
stigmatized. Secularism seems to no longer focus solely on the avoidance of religious
preference but on the perceived brazenness of that religious marker. “I feel like I have to
take off who I am. So I have to come to school empty. When I wear my veil, I just feel so
good (Massi 2015).” If French identity depends on “invisibility” or individual’s ability to
blend in, then anything that identifies them as other or makes them more “visible” is an
issue. Skin color, headscarves, and country origins are all characteristics that penalize
North Africans but not Southern Europeans. For Southern Europeans these characteristics
do not differ from those of native French and, therefore, give them “invisibility.”
The limited labor market participation of Muslim North African women is a
significant domain in which French citizens of North African origin experience the
consequences of being fixed in a positon of the “other.” According to Amnesty
International, women of immigrant origin are often discriminated against based on their
form of dress. “To find a job, you need to open up a business yourself. To get in with
them, you need to act like them. I don’t want to do that (Massi 2015).” France is one of
the few western countries that insists on uniformity (in the place of “retention” of an
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ethnic identity) to achieve full assimilation. Irene Bloemraad argues in her research on
race that even claims of “hyphenated identity,” claiming France and a foreign/minority
culture, is seen negatively (Simon 2012, 3). Among the second generation (ages 18-50) in
France, 66 percent of North Africans feel that they have a French identity as opposed to
feeling separate from the French identity. Approximately 68 percent feel that France is
their home. In the case of Southern European immigrants, the statistics are unsurprisingly
higher, 85.5 and 81.5 percent, respectively (Simon 2012, 9). How immigrants conceive
themselves in French society is often reflective of “othering” or incorporation, and
Southern Europeans evidently do not experience “othering” as much as North Africans.
North Africans’ placement as the other extends beyond secularism and invades the public
discourse.

Public Discourse
In domain of public discourse, the idea of who is and who is not an immigré is
contested. Koopmans emphasizes that the framework of public discourse regarding
immigrants in general is determined by “institutional and discursive opportunity
structures (Koopmans 2005, 16). Apropos discursive constructions, labels that are used to
denote immigrants are not “coincidental and inconsequential.” These terms and the
contexts to which they are employed specify the relationship between immigrants and the
receiving countries (Koopmans 2005, 19). Discursive constructions have influence over
the self-definition of immigrants and how non-minority actors mobilize against or in
support of them. Discursive opportunities function in relation to discursive constructions.
They influence which collective groups have “high” visibility in politics, media, and
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literature. These opportunities determine which groups are able to establish ties with
other collective groups and gain legitimacy in public discourse (Koopmans 2005, 19).
When applied to the question of the socio-economic mobility of North African and
Southern European second generation French, it is apparent that there are discursive
constructions in French society that determine the discursive opportunities or rather the
lack of visibility of the second generation North African French that second generation
Southern Europeans do not experience.
It is possible to claim that North Africans’ visibility and Southern Europeans’
invisibility in the pays d’accueil is due to colonial legacy. North Africans’ history with
France widely differs from that of Southern Europeans. One group has the history of
being the colonized, and the other has a history of being the colonizer. Similar to blacks,
beurs have a historical context (colonization of Algeria) that has influenced their
discursive construction in French society, and no markers in relation to Southern
European immigrants have had the same influence in French society as those of blacks
and beurs. The label of immigrant in France alone does not a hold a fluid connotation; it
is a permanent racial status (Gondola 2009, 158).
In the realm of public discourse, North African French are bombarded with
exemplifications of their lack of invisibility in French society. Their “separation” from
the French identity influences their prevalence in politics, films, and other forms of
media. The term, invisibility, references the politicization of race. The manner in which
race is politicized, particularly for North Africans, alleviates other immigrant
populations, mainly Southern European, of the burden of the label immigré (Gondola
2009, 158).
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The immigré has become a code phrase for race in political
and popular parlance. According to this schema, there is
little doubt that, let’s say, a German or a white American
who settles in France would ever suffer the indignity of
being labeled an immigré (Gondola 2009, 158).

Politics from the earlies 70’s to the present times is one of the many ways in which North
African immigrants are consistently put in the position of the “other.” Several scholars
call this the politicization of “Muslim” in French society. Regarding the “Muslim” label
in France, many scholars have renounced the country’s tendency to portray its North
African population as a “monolithic community”. There is conflict in the political and
ideological titling of the North African community as Muslim. The racialization of Islam
makes “Muslim” an obstacle to inclusion (Fellag 2014, 3). To apply Muslim as a blanket
term denies the fact that there are North Africans who are not “Muslim” and creates a
false linkage between North Africans and a uniform Islamic identity.
Jean Marie Le Pen, the head of the Front National in 1974, led this politicization
of the immigré. It became problem not only for France but for all of Europe despite the
fact that Western European immigrants were just as present as North African immigrants
during this time period (Garrett 2005, 23). Today North African French are not seeing
themselves as much as native French or Southern European French in French media or
French popular culture. At the same time, the far-right media and politics only contribute
to their negative visibility in French society (Boubeker 2009, 74). The image of a
deteriorating France, a France in danger, and a France risking internal ruin due to the lack
of representation of its values has often dominated the perception of an immigrant threat
(Boubeker 2009, 78). Although such a link is not always intended, it is a result. As one
would assume, the use of political rhetoric in this sense only serves in eventually creating
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obstacles to the incorporation of individuals whose origins were neither French nor
European.
Presentation in politics is not the only realm of influence concerning the visibility
of the North African second generation. Media such as films, music, journals, and news
broadcasting equally contribute to the portrayal of the North Africans in French society.
Similar to the unpleasant portrayal in politics, North Africans find themselves presented
as the least-desired citizens. The music and movie industry is not any different. JeanFrancois Richet’s 1997 film Ma T-6 va crack-er adequately describes the gray area in
which North African or “visible” minorities exist. The film depicts three young boys of
the banlieues who wait day to day for the train, France, to stop and allow them to board.
Each day they spot the train, yet it never stops. Each time it passes, they are left with
feelings of hopelessness and dread because they will never be able to escape the racial
and political boundary (the banlieue) and enter French society. The most important
aspect of the movie is the depiction of those who are allowed on the train: people who
look nothing like the three young boys and assume that “people who practice Ramadan
and wear a hijab have no place in France” (Gondola 2009, 158). Richet’s film hints to the
stigma given to North Africans of France and the term “immigrant nee en France.” The
terminology alone implies a disconnection or disinheritance of a people despite their
connection to French soil. The ethnic/ immigrant discourse surrounding Maghrebian
French serves to show how “othering” is perpetuated in popular media.
The conflict surrounding representation and the visibility of North African French
in the news sources tends to be a bit more complex. Major French news outlets have been
credited more than once with the use of taboo or “insensitive” language in reference to
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North African French. A recent poll by the Eurobarometer exhibits the influence the
general French population believes the media has on tensions between ethnic
collectivities. Seventy-one percent of the respondents believed the media (the news, in
particular) plays a strong role (Marsh 2003, 6). Previous research has revealed a pattern
of blanketing visible minorities with some form of the broad terms “immigration” or
“immigrant”. This tendency inevitably distances visible minorities from the “general
French population” (Gondola 2009, 160). It is very subtle but still renders the effect of
framing visible minorities or Maghrebi French regardless of generation as the “other.”
These immigrants under these colloquial blankets tend to be French natives, but, as
Jessika ter Wal mentions, their status is overlooked given a propensity to immediately
label them as immigrants or foreigners.

When a rebeu or a Renoi makes a mistake they (the French
media) report about it but when he (the white French
Person) makes a mistake they don’t or, if they do, they say
he is merely French (Gondola 2009, 160).
The interview with young Muslim Fatima Mane demonstrates how the black and beur
North Africans are racially categorized by the media. When situation concerns an
achievement or something positive, they are French. When the situation concerns a
failure or crime, they are only “immigrants.” Yannick Noah, a well-known tennis play, is
an example this categorization. Headlines such as “le Camerounais Noah a perdu” and
“le Français Yannick Noah a gagné” represent how incorporation tends to be conditional
for non-European, non-Catholic French (Gondola 2009, 160). Aside from the social
distancing, French news outlets often present more crimes that can be tied to black and
beur individuals than non-blacks/beurs (ter Wal 2002, 207). Forty percent is the average
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amount of crime reports linked to blacks and beurs that are released by the press. Blacks
and beurs have dominated crime reports despite their lack of representation in film and
TV dramas (ter Wal 2002, 208). The imbalance of Maghrebian representation in positive
popular media and more specifically their dominant representation in journalized and
televised social/civil conflicts only result in their negative portrayal compared to the
European population’s dominant representation in “convivial forms of social interaction”
(ter Wal 2002, 208).
Obstacles to North African French incorporation into French society is rooted in
the traditional Republic French model with espouses assimilation not just through the
outsider’s renunciation of group identities beyond “French” but also through the
mainstream population’s acceptance of the visibility of the minority group. Laïcité and
public discourse are facets of French society that demonstrate the Franco-French’s
relationship with the North African French identity and culture. Laïcité to a large extent
is what Gondola calls a “litmus test” that these immigrées nées en France must pass in
order to access full incorporation. However, the challenges involving laïcité and public
discourse reflect how “othering” is not only passive but also active in various corners of
the conversation surrounding those who are and are not considered to be French.
Incorporation of immigrant-origin populations is still a challenge in French society. The
North African second generation in particular faces more challenges to incorporation due
to the high visibility of their ethnicity and their confinement within a system that
racializes Islam.
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Conclusion
The analysis of the socio-economic mobility of Maghrebian and Southern
European French aims to uncover driving force behind the imbalance of socio-economic
incorporation between these two dominant ethnic groups in France. The comparison of
the access and success in superior studies and labor market incorporation between the
French, North African, and Southern European born in France implies that passive and/or
active actors are at play in the marginalization of Tunisian, Moroccan, and Algerian
French. This analysis has discussed the different historical contexts that define the
identity and experience of these two immigrant groups and how they play a role in setting
the possible present and future socio-economic trajectory of Maghrebian and Southern
European French.
Focusing on the exogenous factors of French society, this exploration of France’s
political economy and active marginalization of immigrants as “not truly French” aims to
discover the political and social obstacles to incorporation that can only be attributed
weakness within the French institutions and public discourse. While many scholars
emphasize the willingness of the immigrant and the descendants to integrate and
importance of the barriers within the ethnic community, I chose not to focus on
endogenous factors in this thesis. However, I do acknowledge that barriers within an
ethnic community does have a role in this conflict of socio-economic advancement.
Nonetheless, I believe the influence of such endogenous elements to be not as significant
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or marking as the issues within French society that push against the socio-economic
mobility of the North African second generation. Research from the Migration Policy
Institute shows that the majority of second generation immigrants identifies as French. In
addition, these policies and methods of social exclusion would still have an effect
regardless of the willingness or reluctance of the individual to integrate.
As the first part of this analysis elucidates, the political economy of France is a
factor that holds significant influence on the manner in which certain groups are
propelled into or gain access to the resources of socio-economic success. By scrutinizing
the influence of tax/ benefit systems, residential policies, and the education structure, the
question of the disparity of socio-economic success rest on whether or not the French
government construes these policies in a fashion that is not conducive to the
incorporation of some immigrants. The fact that the North African immigrants are the
most subjected to the failings of these policies is due in part to obtainment of a superior
education, family size, the employment status of the parents and peers, and other
demographic characteristics. The information on the policies and the status of second
generation North African French during the application of these policies all confirm that
the North African French are often overlooked in creation of the policies leading to their
eventual lack of success in education and the labor market. This information rightfully
calls for a reconfiguration or restructuring of the aims of these policies and how they
should be implemented.
Regarding the role of social barriers to incorporation, the conflict surrounding
secularism in the French States implies two different concepts: freedom from religious
influence in the government and the public space and acceptance of religious
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representation that is not “too ostentatious.” The debate over the headscarf and the
professional marginalization of women who attempt to enter the workforce exhibits how
the visibility of the North African second generation serves to penalize them in the
incorporation process. The stigmatization of “Muslim,” blacks, and beurs in public
discourse (news broadcast, film, music, etc.) displays how “Muslim” has become
racialized in a negative sense. Evidently, blacks and beurs are depicted as undesirables
who will never be “really French”.
Political economy as an exogenous factor focuses more on the passive
marginalization of North African French while public discourse and secularism imply a
more active marginalization of the North African second generation and the inherent
acceptance of the Southern European second generation. Based on the historical context
behind North African immigration and North African culture’s interaction with French
culture, the social aspect of the exogenous factor holds more weight than the political
economy. By analyzing policies and structures, it is evident that these policies perpetuate
the exclusion of North Africans. There are specific demographics that turn political
economy into a tool of marginalization. However, these social barriers are conflicts that
one could say any North African French would encounter regardless of social and
economic demographics. It is the stigmatization and active exclusion of North Africans
that influence the creation of these policies and their goals.
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